45 pages • 1 hour read
Rachel Maddow, Michael YarvitzBag Man: The Wild Crimes, Audacious Cover-Up, and Spectacular Downfall of a Brazen Crook in the White House
Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 2020A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Chapter 9-12Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Chapter 9 Summary: “High-Risk Ball”
In 1971, as Nixon begins his reelection campaign, he sends Agnew on an 11-country “goodwill tour” meant to burnish the V.P.’s foreign policy credentials. Nixon, however, is horrified when sees television images of Agnew spending much of his time golfing. His annoyance over the golfing crystallizes all of his previous resentment of his vice president: “The laziness. The entitlement […]. If [Nixon] had behaved that way, he once said, ‘Ike [Dwight Eisenhower under whom Nixon served as V.P.] would have fired my ass’” (138). Even before the end of his first term, Nixon tries to find a plausible excuse to dump Agnew from the ticket. He and Haldeman run through a variety of options. They could find Agnew a cushy corporate job: “get somebody to buy CBS and let Agnew run it’” (139); or, they could appoint him to the Supreme Court. But these ideas are all nonstarters. Eventually, Nixon decides to freeze Agnew out of the inner circle, isolating him and minimizing the damage he can inflict. Still, despite his overwhelming election victory less than a year earlier, Watergate threatens to derail one of the most powerful presidencies in history.
Meanwhile, special prosecutor Archibald Cox closes in, suing in court to obtain all audio recordings pertaining to the Watergate investigation; and Martha Mitchell, wife of Nixon’s first Attorney General John Mitchell, tells the press that Nixon, despite his assertions to the contrary, “was aware of the whole goddamned thing” (144). Finally, a federal judge overrules Nixon’s argument and orders him to turn over the tapes. Nixon, knowing what is at stake, refuses to comply. Agnew, meanwhile, feels the pressure from his own investigation and calls on Nixon for support. Nixon offers it, publicly declaring his confidence in Agnew’s integrity. Behind the scenes, however, Nixon wants Agnew gone, but first he gauges how much of a fight his vice president will put up.
Martin London and his defense team intend to argue that Agnew cannot be indicted because of his position as vice president. The practical implications would be far too fraught—for example, if Agnew is found guilty and sentenced to jail time, and then Nixon is forced out of office, Agnew could theoretically be named president while in jail. The question then arises of whether he could pardon himself. The defense argues that Agnew must be impeached before any indictment can be handed down. With Richardson ready to present his case before a grand jury, Nixon decides the only option is for Agnew to resign. Chief-of-Staff Haig delivers the news, but Agnew angrily claims he is being “railroaded.” Haig is adamant, however, informing Agnew that, if he continues to resist, he will lose Nixon’s support.
Chapter 10 Summary: “Two Conditions”
In September 1973, Agnew’s personal attorney, Judah Best, calls Richardson and says Agnew is willing to strike a deal. With an “ironclad” case in hand, and Agnew facing up to decades in prison, Richardson is prepared to play “hardball.” After a tense first meeting, the prosecution and defense teams are at a standstill. By the next meeting, however, Agnew indicates he will accept a plea bargain. His terms, as his lawyers spell out, include resignation “with dignity,” no charges of bribery, and no jail time. Richardson’s main objective is to remove Agnew from the presidential line of succession, and therefore resignation might be an adequate resolution. For Beall and his team, who have labored over a year to build their case, the possibility that Agnew might walk free is a “hard sell.” But with Nixon “hanging on by his fingernails” (160), the Baltimore prosecutors all recognize the necessity of speed. They need to reach a deal before Nixon’s time is up and Agnew becomes president. Richardson’s associate, Henry Petersen, pushes for resignation with no jail time and is furious with Baker, Skolnik, and Liebman for their resistance.
Meanwhile, Nixon is prepared to sacrifice Agnew for his own self-interest. To “get his problem cleared up” (162), Nixon agrees not to obstruct the Agnew investigation. Afterwards, the president wants Archibald Cox fired as special prosecutor. Agnew, however, remains highly popular within the GOP, so Nixon cannot be seen as having betrayed his vice president. It must be perceived as simply a legal matter. Behind the scenes, though, Nixon quietly urges Agnew to resign and put the whole “miserable business” behind them. Agnew is prepared to take Richardson’s deal, but before he can sign it, the press scoops the story. One headline announces Agnew “Bargaining for Lighter Charge” (165). Furious at the bad PR, he decides to fight to the bitter end.
Chapter 11 Summary: “In His Time of Greatest Need”
Frank Sinatra, once a loyal Democrat and friend of John F. Kennedy, becomes close with Agnew, a fellow “proud and scrappy son[s] of European immigrants” (168). Sinatra’s alleged mob ties don’t matter at all to Agnew who, like Sinatra, places loyalty above all else. Sinatra raises money for Agnew’s defense fund and places his personal lawyer at the vice president’s disposal.
Richardson’s office, meanwhile, receives an instructive memo from its own Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) which offers deliberative and well-researched advice on thorny legal questions. The question in this case is whether a sitting vice president can be indicted. The memo suggests that, according to the Constitution and 200 years of precedent, the president is shielded from prosecution while in office, but not after impeachment and removal. Richardson’s office wants to know if a criminal case can be brought against a vice president. After consulting with a Richardson aide, the OLC opinion argues that yes, a sitting vice president can be indicted since, unlike the president, his duties are far less crucial to the administration of the government. Despite several logical holes in the memo, Richardson got his “green light” to proceed. He and Petersen inform Nixon that they are about to present evidence against Agnew to a grand jury, and Nixon tells them he will not interfere.
Chapter 12 Summary: “I’m a Big Trophy”
Meanwhile, Agnew presents a letter to Speaker of the House, Carl Albert, requesting that the House investigate him with his full cooperation. He believes he will fare better among his peers in Congress than with a Baltimore grand jury, given his sense that his fellow politicians have all played the same game. Even if impeachment charges are brought up, at least that will force Richardson to “stand down.” The chairman of the House Judiciary Committee does not fall for the scheme. Two days later, Skolnik, Liebman, and Baker present their evidence to the grand jury; Agnew’s defense is that a sitting vice president cannot be indicted. While the judge deliberates, Agnew heads to Los Angeles for a convention of the National Federation of Republican Women, where his speech will be nationally televised. Inside the convention center, Agnew proclaims his innocence to a raucous crowd of supporters. He turns his anger on the Department of Justice (DOJ), specifically Henry Petersen whose “ineptness” and “malicious” motives have, Agnew asserts, tainted his reputation. He then declares publicly that, even if indicted, he refuses to resign. The crowd goes wild.
Chapter 9-12 Analysis
These chapters detail the fraught relationship between Nixon and Agnew. For all of Nixon’s personal faults, he understands the responsibilities—if not the moral duties—of the presidency. While he may be remembered as a “crook,” his list of domestic and foreign policy accomplishments is impressive: He opened diplomatic ties with Communist China, brokered nuclear arms agreements with the Soviet Union, ended the military draft, and created the Environmental Protection Agency. He was a deeply flawed man but a knowledgeable and savvy president. Agnew, however, is a political neophyte, and it shows. His continued extortion of government contractors even after becoming vice president, his golfing excursions while on a diplomatic trip, and his attempt to use allies in the House of Representatives to forestall an indictment all speak to broad corruption and a fundamental misunderstanding of the power and privilege of his office. Nixon recognizes this—although the corruption part seems to be the least of his worries—and seeks to distance himself from his second-in-command. While presidential candidates have often chosen their running mates based on political expediency, the level of antagonism Nixon feels toward Agnew prevents any kind of productive working relationship. Toward the end, Nixon even suggests that his vice president should resign, and the president’s inner circle begin to consider a replacement. Ironically, Nixon chose Agnew for his popularity within the conservative Republican base, but whatever advantages Agnew’s presence confers quickly evaporates and becomes instead an anchor around Nixon’s neck.
Maddow and Yarvitz also use this nearly forgotten moment in history as a primer in Constitutional law. The questions posed by this case are tangled. The Constitution says nothing about indicting a sitting vice president, so legal scholars are left to sift through Article II, plus two centuries of legal precedent, and then make their best guess. The law may appear to be black and white, but these chapters show how much of it is based on interpretation. Legal scholars interpret the Constitution to craft their arguments, and the judiciary further interprets those arguments when deciding law. All of these actors in the legal process are human beings, subject to their own biases and assumptions, so the law is far from strictly objective. In Agnew’s case, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel writes a long and circular memo branching off into off-topic tangents before finally seeking the advice of Richardson’s office—and the memo ultimately reflects that advice. Despite Agnew’s assertions of a “witch hunt” and being targeted by a liberal news media, the attorneys do the best they can by earnestly wrestling with the law. The fact that he was indicted by appointees of his own party suggests that the law can be nonpartisan when it needs to be.
