The Myth of the Eternal Return

In “Repetition of the Cosmogony,” the fourth section of Chapter 1, Eliade initiates his discussion of repetition, another key element of archaic ontology. In the previous sections, Eliade articulates the construction of sacred places, whether the literal building of a temple or the symbol of the center. Now he articulates the creation of sacred times. Cosmogony is the study of the origins of the universe. In the present age, it is considered a branch of physics, a physical science. For archaic humanity, however, cosmogonies were myths of divine creation. In re-enacting such cosmogonic creation, archaic humanity does not, obviously, create the universe, but they do make “sacred time” (21). Eliade’s preferred term for “sacred time” is the Latin phrase in illo tempore. In sacred rites that imitate the cosmogonic actions of the gods (or God), archaic humanity is lifted into mythical time and away from the profane, everyday time of ordinary life.

In the next section, “Divine Models of Rituals,” Eliade develops the concept of the archetype. Archetypes are divine models, or paradigms. They are exemplary cases worthy of imitation and recreation. In this context, recreation does not mean playful entertainment. It means the re-creation of an archetype. It literally means to make something anew. Eliade notes that in many cases, “religious acts are held to have been founded by gods, civilizing heros, or mythical ancestors” (22). All of these are archetypal heroes of some form, and all of them institute rites that archaic humanity reproduced. The sabbath is one such rite. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, worshippers take a day of rest in imitation of God’s rest on the seventh day of creation. Christian love is another such example, following the archetypal character of Jesus. Cross-culturally, marriage rites also follow divine models: “Marital union is a rite integrated with the cosmic rhythm and validated by that integration” (25). This union, as the reproduction of the union of the masculine and feminine cosmic forces, could be viewed as integral to cosmic creation. Other rites, like “orgiastic excesses'' in ancient Sumerian societies, “find their justification in a cosmic or biocosmic act: regeneration of the year, critical period of the harvest, and so forth” (26-27).

“Archetypes of Profane Activities,” the sixth section, is actually about the lack of profane activity in archaic societies. The profane realm did exist, but it was secondary in importance. Eliade writes that any activity with a “definite meaning […] in some way participates in the sacred” (27-28). These meaningful activities include war, the hunt, the harvest, and dance, among many others. The general notion is that life was oriented around sacred ritual. In the modern world, these same activities are done solely for need, defense, entertainment, etc. They are not modeled after divine action, nor do they have a life of their own above and beyond the life of the individual participants. Among his many examples of archaic models of meaning, Eliade invokes Plato and Aristotle, both of whom envisioned the virtuous life as resembling that of god. There are no archetypes of profane activities. There are activities that would seem profane from the modern perspective, but these are also held sacred by archaic humanity. Their meanings cannot be reduced to “rationalistic motives” but are fully explainable only through reference to the sacred (29).

The final, and longest, section of Chapter 1, “Myths and History,” expands the distinction between the sacred and the profane. It provides some reflections on the earlier sections of the chapter. Eliade calls attention to a paradox, or at least what his readers might think is a paradox: “that the man of a traditional culture sees himself as real only to the extent that he ceases to be himself and is satisfied with imitating and repeating the gestures of another. In other words, he sees himself as real, i.e., as ‘truly himself,’ only, and precisely, insofar as he ceases to be so” (34). Though this seems paradoxical, it simply means that an archaic person also had a fundamentally different notion of who they were; ontologically, the archaic self was not viewed as individual or unique but as a participant in something larger. This is, at least, the view of the self in the sacred realm; the profane realm exists, and in this place of individual action, the individual exists, too—but archaic ontology does not see the profane realm as the place for the true self.

Eliade ends the chapter by engaging the question of history and the mythical construction of real, historical people. While there is a “real” history of individual people and events, societies will mythologize this history over time, transforming it into mythical accounts of heroes and other archetypal figure: “Popular memory,” Eliade writes, has an “anhistorical character” (46). This means that a collective memory process warps the lives of real individuals into archetypal stories. Although this mythologizing tendency survives in the modern world, the impulse is in tension with the development of historical consciousness; the latter ascribes importance to the personal history, memory, and experience of the individual. These individualistic elements are connected to novelty and irreversibility in life and time: “Archaic humanity defended itself, to the utmost of its powers, against all the novelty and irreversibility which history entails” (48).

By the end of Chapter 1, “Archetypes and Repetition,” Eliade has produced a systematic overview of archaic ontology. This ontology is presented in piecemeal, so the core ideas may become muddled or lost. The following reiterates the basic components of archaic ontology:

• The center functions as an order (and intersection) between two realms of existence: the celestial (heavenly) and the earthly.
• That which is most real is creative; creativity, and only creativity, imbues the world with being. Sacred practice is more real than profane life because it reconstitutes archetypal creation.
• Freedom consists in creative action.
• One is most oneself when one participates in a sacred ritual that subsumes one’s individual identity within a higher truth.

These are interrelated aspects of one, general ontological perspective. They are mutually reinforcing parts of an implicit whole, a fundamental orientation toward the world. In articulating this worldview in the first chapter, Eliade is able to develop it more concretely in the following chapter and to contrast it with the modern attitude. Though archaic ontology might sound strange and foreign, Eliade hopes to provide a useful contrast to modern ontology, which leads, he believes, to despair and meaninglessness. Modern life is increasingly void of sacred space. Eliade writes of the ancient pilgrimage, “Attaining the center is equivalent to a consecration, an initiation; yesterday’s profane and illusory existence gives place to a new, to a life that is real, enduring, and effective” (18). The value of the archaic perspective rests in the sense of reality and efficacy it provides, and this perspective may be more crucial than ever.