43 pages • 1 hour read
George StephanopoulosThe Situation Room: The Inside Story of Presidents in Crisis
Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 2024A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Chapters 4-6Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Chapter 4 Summary: “S.O.S.”
In Chapter 4, Stephanopoulos examines an incident that took place during the short presidency of Gerald Ford, who had taken office in August 1974 following the resignation of Richard Nixon. Ford faced a major international crisis the following spring, when a US cargo ship in the Gulf of Siam, the S.S. Mayaguez, was seized by the Khmer Rouge regime of Cambodia.
The author explains that this incident brings to light one of the key challenges faced by Situation Room staff—whether to wake a sleeping president immediately. He argues that “deciding when to alert the president and other top officials to unfolding events is a crucial Sit Room function” (70). Stephanopoulos then provides similar examples from other administrations in which the question of when to alert a president to a crisis has arisen.
Ford decided to use military force to recapture the Mayaguez and its crewmembers by invading the Cambodian island where the ship was believed to be. This incident highlights the role of modern technology in national security, as the American fighter pilots were able to communicate almost directly with top administration officials as the attack was underway.
Chapter 5 Summary: “Close Encounters”
Chapter 5 looks at the administration of Jimmy Carter and examines the Iran Hostage Crisis, which dominated the final year of Carter’s presidency.
Stephanopoulos begins with an anecdote concerning a 1980 Situation Room meeting with Carter, the First Lady, and an NSC staffer who was involved with Operation Grill Flame, a top-secret military program that “explored the use of parapsychology to gather intelligence” (89). While many top government officials were skeptical of the project, President Carter and his wife, Rosalynn, were not. Carter asked the NSC staffer if his work could help with the American hostages in Iran.
This extraordinary Situation Room meeting came 186 days after the Iranian Hostage Crisis began. In early November 1979, a group of militant supporters of the new theocratic Iranian government stormed the US embassy in Tehran. They took more than 60 Americans hostage in retaliation for the American government providing refuge to the deposed shah of Iran, a longtime American ally.
Over the next five months, the Situation Room was utilized every day by high-level officials to discuss the crisis. By April 1980, Carter made the decision to attempt the high-stakes rescue mission known as Desert One. The mission, however, turned into a debacle, which “effectively ended Carter’s presidency” (107). Stephanopoulos also argues that “it would also haunt the Situation Room for decades to come, hovering like a specter over planning sessions for later military missions” (107).
Chapter 6 Summary: “The Helm Is Right Here”
In late March 1981, only months after being sworn in, President Ronald Reagan was the target of an assassination attempt and was seriously wounded from a bullet that had ricocheted off the presidential limousine. This led to one of the most confusing and tense moments in the history of the Situation Room and White House. Since Vice President George H.W. Bush was on a flight back to Washington and no secure voice connection was available, confusion set in over who should provide information to the public, who was in charge, and most importantly, who was in control of the “football”—“the black briefcase containing the codes for launching nuclear strikes” (118).
According to Stephanopoulos, Secretary of State Alexander Haig “very quickly assumed a posture of control” as to who should be the lead communicator at the White House (118). Haig also wanted the football “within reach” and went public with the notion that he was in charge until the vice president arrived. Constitutionally, however, the line of succession is the vice president, the Speaker of the House, and the president pro tempore of the Senate.
The specter of nuclear war and what some saw as “a holy battle of a God-fearing nation versus a godless one” served as the backdrop for Regan’s second term (131). Due to the nuclear threat and the belief that the Sit Room was not used properly, a Crisis Management Center (CMC) was created. The CMC allowed National Security Advisor John Poindexter to circumvent security controls typically associated with the Sit Room. Poindexter, together with Oliver North, a top Security Council aide, hatched an illegal arms-for-hostages deal that became known as the Iran-Contra Affair. During the Iran-Contra Affair, members of the National Security Council illegally sold weapons to Iran and diverted funds to right-wing Nicaraguan Contras trying to overthrow the leftist Sandinista government. Stephanopoulos argues that “this was unprecedented, illegal and against the entire ethos of the Situation Room. Yet there were those in the Sit Room who knew what he was doing and supported it—tacitly or otherwise” (138). While the Situation Room had always been rigorously apolitical, North’s anti-communist zeal undermined that neutrality.
Chapters 4-6 Analysis
In Chapters 4 through 6, Stephanopoulos examines the usage of the Situation Room during the presidencies of Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan. He places a special emphasis on The Evolution of National Security Practices over a series of major crises, such as the Mayaguez Incident and the Iran Hostage Crisis. These chapters examine the respective crises not only in how they related to the Situation Room and how it was used but also in how they affected the president.
In the case of President Carter, the Iran Hostage Crisis was not only agonizing, but “effectively ended [his] presidency” (107). Stephanopoulos depicts Carter’s agony by recounting the NSC staffer’s meeting with the president and First Lady, who asked him if his work in the paranormal sphere could help in some way to get the hostages back. Similarly, the author uses an anecdote concerning the 1982 readiness drill, code-named Ivy League, that mimicked the events of a nuclear war. Reagan used the Situation Room to witness what the consequences of nuclear war would be and had his “perception of nuclear weapons changed forever” (130).
Throughout Chapters 4 through 6, there is also a special emphasis on The Role of Technology in Governance. When President Ford faced the Mayaguez crisis, he gave the order that American pilots could sink Cambodian boats. Thanks to new satellite communications, a pilot was able to speak directly to the president and relayed the message that one of his targets could contain American prisoners, so Ford chose not to fire. As a result, “Ford’s decision had saved them” (79). Similarly, during Reagan’s second term, when the Iran-Contra Affair was unfolding, it was the role of technology in government that eventually revealed the illegal actions that had been taken. Stephanopoulos argues that “the first administration in history to use email became the first to suffer an email scandal” (139). This was because Poindexter and North attempted to destroy evidence by deleting emails.
