40 pages • 1 hour read
Robert F. KennedyThirteen Days
Nonfiction | Autobiography / Memoir | Adult | Published in 1968A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Pages 19-36Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Chapter Summary: “Tuesday morning, October 16, 1962…”
The President summoned Robert Kennedy to the White House and informed him that US Intelligence believed, based on photographic evidence, that Russia was installing nuclear weapons in Cuba. This “was the beginning of the Cuban Missile Crisis—a confrontation between the two giant atomic nations, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.” (19).
In September, just a few weeks earlier, Robert Kennedy met with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, and questioned him about reports of Soviet military shipments to Cuba and construction of a military base there. Dobrynin responded that Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev had authorized him to communicate his “assurances” that there would be no “offensive weapons” in Cuba and that the Soviets would not do anything to “disrupt the relationship of our two countries during this period prior to the election” (21). Robert Kennedy’s reaction was “skepticism,” and when summarizing his meeting for the President, he advised the President to declare that the U.S. “would not tolerate the introduction of offensive surface-to-surface missiles, or offensive weapons of any kind, into Cuba” which the President did on September 4 (22). In response, the Soviets declared that they would not place missiles in Cuba.
Later that morning, President Kennedy convened a meeting of top aides, cabinet members and other government officials to advise him on the crisis. This group would meet nearly non-stop throughout the crisis and later became officially known as Ex Comm (Executive Committee of the National Security Council). Robert Kennedy describes the initial reaction of the participants as they learned of the Cuban development, “as stunned surprise. No one had expected or anticipated that the Russians would deploy surface to surface ballistic missiles in Cuba” (20). Most of the participants at the initial meeting favored an air strike on Cuba in response to the missiles, although a few argued that the United States did not need to react, since, in their view, “the missiles did not alter the balance of power” (25).
After the crisis, the committee learned that there had been some reports of military build-up in Cuba that were not considered credible enough to pass on to higher levels of government. According to the post-crisis analysis, it is unclear whether this information would have changed anything, as there was insufficient evidence to justify American action to the rest of the world.
Chapter Summary: “The President…knew he would have to act.”
The President charged the committee with formulating a response to the situation. Knowing that his presence would possibly restrain discussions, the president chose not to attend every meeting. The possibility of establishing a blockade around Cuba was proposed. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara argued strongly for a blockade as a powerful initial intervention that did not risk immediate retaliation. Others argued for a military strike as a more effective route to eliminating the missiles. No consensus or agreement emerged.
Photos from Wednesday, October 17 showed more missile installations in Cuba with the potential to kill tens of millions of Americans. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated for “immediate military action” (28). The President acknowledged the risks of forgoing a military strike, including an increased number of missiles and fostering the impression that the U.S. was weak. There was a limited period of time in which to respond before the missiles would be ready for launch. McNamara, although opposed to a military strike, told the President that the requisite personnel and equipment were being readied if an attack was ordered.
Robert Kennedy also supported the blockade, primarily for moral reasons: “like others, I could not accept the idea that the United States would rain bombs on Cuba, killing thousands and thousands of civilians in a surprise attack” (29).
Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson began attending the meetings, advocating persuasively for an attack. Robert Kennedy countered that “a surprise attack by a very large nation against a small one” would jeopardize the “moral position” of the U.S. in the world (30). The ethical issue of killing innocent civilians was “a question that deeply troubled us all” (31).
Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, came to the White House for a meeting that had been scheduled prior to the crisis. President Kennedy chose not to divulge his knowledge of the missiles until America had devised a response. Gromyko, on behalf of Chairman Khrushchev, asked that the U.S. to stop threatening Cuba and assured the President that the Soviets were only providing agricultural support and defensive weapons, not offensive weapons. The President responded that Russians providing weapons to Cuba was, in fact, a threat to the United States, and he reiterated “the serious consequences that would arise if the Soviet Union placed missiles or offensive weapons within Cuba” (32).
Chapter Summary: “A majority opinion…for a blockade …”
A majority of the committee emerged in favor of a blockade while meeting at the State Department on Thursday evening. The group all crammed into Robert Kennedy’s limousine to avoid the attention that would be attracted by a flurry of limousines arriving at the White House. After the committee delivered their proposal, the President began questioning their recommendation. As the meeting progressed, participants began to shift their positions, and by the end of the meeting there was no longer a clear consensus for a blockade.
President Kennedy instructed them to continue meeting while the President maintained his normal schedule to avoid press scrutiny. When the group resumed meeting the following morning, the stress of the situation began to show, and tempers were often short, as they felt the responsibility of making “a recommendation which, if wrong and if accepted, could mean the destruction of the human race” (35).
Compounding the tension was “the fact that there was no obvious or simple solution” (35). Each alternative was flawed and carried vulnerabilities, and there was not much time left to complete their task. The committee agreed to split into two groups to develop a detailed course of action for each position, blockade versus military strike. On Friday afternoon, they “exchanged papers, each group dissected and criticized the other, and the papers were returned to the original group to develop further answers” (36). When they were finished, the committee had developed a framework for implementing a blockade and initiating military action.
The blockade plan included a legal rationale, procedures for addressing the Organization of American States and the United Nations, and military protocols for intercepting ships, culminating in conditions, which might require military force. For military action, the plan also included addressing the U.N., as well as a delineation of targets for attack, gaining the support of Latin American countries, and a warning to the Soviets against responding with force.
Despite the pressures and tensions, Robert Kennedy noted that the members of the committee “all spoke as equals” with “an equal opportunity to express himself and be heard” in “uninhibited and unrestricted” deliberations, which was an uncommon occurrence at that level of government (36).
Pages 19-36 Analysis
Robert Kennedy was the Attorney General of the United States and younger brother of President John Kennedy. As his brother’s closest confidant, he was trusted with a broad range of sensitive tasks, beyond those usually associated with his cabinet position, and privy to the President’s personal thoughts and opinions. Thirteen Days is organized chronologically into titled sections that resemble diary entries more than chapters and focus on critical events and meetings as the crisis develops.
The book begins with “Tuesday morning, October 16, 1962…,” when Robert Kennedy first learns about the Soviet missiles in Cuba from his brother in a private meeting. Later that morning the President convenes a group of top-level government officials who will advise him throughout the crisis. Robert Kennedy stresses that these were men of the highest caliber, intelligent, hardworking, and committed to serving their country. He also credits the President for having the wisdom to leave the group to deliberate at times without him, thus freeing the participants from self-consciousness or concerns with his reaction. President Kennedy’s leadership of this deliberative process, emphasizing exploring and analyzing potential responses and alternatives, and encouraging the free expression of divergent viewpoints is one of the themes of the book.
After the initial shock of discovery, most of the committee initially favors a military strike, and as they continue to meet, a group emerges in favor of a blockade. Analyzing and arguing the merits of a blockade versus a military strike becomes the focus of the group as they struggle to determine the best course of action to recommend to the President. This debate becomes the central issue in formulating the American response. Another theme that emerges from this debate is the very real threat of nuclear war resulting from the committee’s recommendations, and the moral responsibility of leaders for the consequences of military actions.
The critical need for secrecy is also evident from the beginning of the book. The President needed time to develop a course of action in response to the situation before the press alerted the American public to the crisis or the Russians discovered that the U.S. government knew about the missiles. The President followed his regular schedule and the committee met at the State Department to avoid attracting attention.
